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Abstract
Recent literature has argued that, contrary to the results of a seminal paper by Rose (2004),
WTO membership does promote bilateral trade, at least for developed economies and if
membership includes non-formal compliance. We review the literature in order to identify
open issues. We then develop the simplest possible “corner-solutions” version of the gravity
model which serves as a framework to readdress these issues. We focus on the extensive
margin of trade that separates positive-trade from zero-trade country pairs. We argue that
the model can be consistently estimated using Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood methods
with exporter and importer fixed effects. We account for coding issues and the potential
heterogeneity of the WTO membership which recent contributions have stressed. While we
find that WTO membership increases the likelihood that a given country pair trades, we
do not find that the extensive margin has a strong and systematic effect on the average
trade-creating potential of the WTO.
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1 Introduction
Any country becoming a member of the WTO is expected to honor its guiding principles.
These are: a) Most-favored nation treatment, b) national treatment of foreign goods, services
and intellectual property rights, c) multilateral negotiations on reciprocal reductions of trade
barriers, d) fair competition rules related to dumping and subsidies, including a mechanism of
dispute settlement, and e) preferential treatment of developing countries.1 Judging from the
degree of compliance, member countries in many instances appear to question the national
advantage of adhering to these principles. Membership often seems to come at the cost of
foregoing preferred policies, or having to yield concessions with unwelcome effects. Yet, overall
these principles should lead to a transparent and predictable world trading environment that
features open markets, thus enhancing world efficiency.2 Therefore, WTO membership is
commonly regarded as a key vehicle to enhance the growth and development perspectives of
less developed countries.
In 1947, there were 23 founding signatories of the GATT. Presently, as many as 153
countries are members of the WTO. Moreover, the GATT/WTO was remarkably successful
in reducing the level of trade barriers through 8 successive rounds of multilateral negotiations.
On average, the import tariffs applied by GATT/WTO members have fallen to levels that are
a mere quarter of what they were after the Second World War.3 There was thus a widening as
well as deepening of trade liberalization throughout the 6 decades that the GATT/WTO has
been in existence. This was paralleled by an enormous post World War II increase in world
trade, relative to world production. Between 1950 and 2005, the average annual growth rate
of the volume of world exports was 6.2 percent (7.5 percent for manufactures), compared
1See the WTO’s self-characterization on http://www.wto.org/, as well as chapter 3 in Bagwell & Stagier
(2003).
2See Bagwell & Staiger (2003) for an in-depth analysis of the efficiency-enhancing potential of a WTO-like
world trading system.
3The negotiations are about tariff ceilings (or bindings). Applied tariffs are typically below the ceilings.
The WTO estimates that prior to the first round of negotiations (Geneva 1947), the average applied tariff rate
across all member countries was between 20 and 30 percent. The Geneva round has brought a weighted US
tariff reduction by 26 percent, with a cumulative further cut by 15 percent through the next four rounds of
negotiation (Annecy 1949, Torquay 1951, Geneva 1956, Dillon 1962). Next came three more ambitious rounds
of negotiations (Kennedy 1967, Tokyo 1979, and Uruguay 1994), each with average applied tariff cuts by well
above 30 percent for industrial countries, affecting an ever larger amount of world trade. Thus, for the US,
Canada and the major European countries, the import-weighted average applied tariff rate went down from 15
percent in 1952 to 4,1 percent in 2005. The negotiations also included reductions in quantitative restrictions
and other non-tariff barriers, as well as export subsidies. For more details, see the WTO World Trade Report
2007. For the entire world, the World Bank estimates a reduction of the unweighted average of import tariffs
tariff from 26.3 percent in 1986 to 8.8 in 2007; see the Data & Research Website of the World Bank.
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with a real GDP growth of 3.8 percent.4 The GATT/WTO almost routinely receives credit
as a causal factor for this increase in world trade.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, when Rose (2004a) set out to quantify the trade-enhancing
role of WTO membership in an econometric study of world trade based on the gravity equa-
tion, he ended up concluding that “we currently do not have strong empirical evidence that the
GATT/WTO has systematically played a strong role in encouraging trade”. In a companion
paper, Rose (2004b) has studied the trade policies pursued, to arrive at the conclusion that
WTO member countries also do not follow more liberal trade policies than non-members.
These papers have questioned the conventional view of the GATT/WTO as a significant
trade-promoting institution.
However, subsequent literature has readdressed the issue, adding specific pieces of re-
visionist evidence. Thus, Subramanian & Wei (2007) have shown that WTO membership
appears more valuable (in terms of trade creation) to industrial countries than developing
countries, while Tomz, Goldstein & Rivers (2007) have emphasized that WTO member-
ship does promote trade, if defined to include non-formal (or de facto) compliance with
GATT/WTO rules. However, doubts remain. Rose (2007) points out certain puzzles that
cast doubt on the trade-promoting role of non-formal membership. Eicher & Henn (2008)
question the findings of Subramanian & Wei (2007) on the grounds of a more comprehen-
sive treatment of preferential trade agreements alongside WTO membership, as well as on
econometric grounds.5
This paper revisits the issue by looking at a place of potential evidence that has so far
received relatively scant attention. By restricting his sample to country pairs where trade
is strictly positive, Rose (2004a) has ignored the possibility that WTO membership may be
important for whether or not two countries trade with each other at all. This is the so called
extensive margin of world trade, as opposed to the intensive margin relating to how existing
trading relationships evolve through larger or smaller quantities traded. Felbermayr & Kohler
(2006) present detailed evidence on the relative importance of these two margins, concluding
that the postwar increase of world trade took place through both, larger quantities traded
(the intensive margin) and an increase in the number of country pairs that engage in trade
(extensive margin). The question then is whether WTO membership comes out as a stronger
trade promoting force if movements at the extensive margin of trade are adequately taken
into account. Evidence pointing in this direction is presented in Liu (2007), as well as in
Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008). In this paper, we present evidence that sheds new
4See again the most recent WTO World Trade Report 2007.
5See also Rose (2006) for a comprehensive reply to the literature subsequent to Rose (2004a).
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light on this issue.
More specifically, we contribute to the literature as follows. First, we present a com-
prehensive review of the literature which clearly identifies the open issues. Secondly, we
develop the simplest possible theoretical framework for a gravity equation that allows for
country pairs with zero trade, thereby generalizing the well-known Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003) model. Third, we estimate this model using a Poisson approach, in order to
deal with the inherent non-linearity of any gravity model of bilateral trade that allows for
zero trade. We argue on grounds of careful data inspection that any empirical analysis of
the importance of the extensive margin should rely on cross-sectional variation, rather than
panel estimation. And finally, when comparing the extensive margin and intensive margin
effects of GATT/WTO membership, we also address the concerns raised in Subramanian &
Wei (2007) about appropriate country pooling, as well as the issue of informal participation
in the GATT/WTO raised by Tomz et al. (2008). Overall our results question the view that
WTO membership has had much of an influence at the extensive margin of world trade.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we first discuss the present state
of the literature. In section 3, we present a simple theoretical model of the gravity equation
that incorporates zero trade as an equilibrium outcome determined among other things by
GATT/WTO membership. In section 4, we discuss our data base for econometric estimation,
including some preliminary descriptive exploration that guides our estimation strategy. Sec-
tion 5 takes a Probit-look at the extensive margin of trade, while section 6 presents results
from a comprehensive estimation of the nonlinear gravity model. Section 7 will summarize
and draw conclusions from our findings.
2 State of the literature
Given the aforementioned consensus view of the GATT/WTO, it is not surprising that
Rose’s (2004a) finding has caught a great deal of attention. It seems to cast doubt on the
GATT/WTO as a “success story” that exemplifies the virtues of multilateral trade liberal-
ization. But perhaps one should not be too surprised. It is well known that the GATT/WTO
was only partly successful in delivering trade policies toward freer trade. There were sectoral
exemptions, most notably in agriculture and textiles, and there were country exemptions
as well. For instance, up until 1995 developing countries were facing little demand for lib-
eralization when they became members. Moreover, member countries have partly undone
negotiated tariff cuts by introducing non-tariff barriers. They have also made extensive use
— sometimes abusively — of anti-dumping and safeguard provisions, as well as the WTO’s
dispute settlement mechanism, with disruptive effects on trade.
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In a companion paper, Rose (2004b) has substantiated this concern by examining whether
GATT/WTO member countries have systematically followed more liberal trade policies
than non-members. His conclusion is that “there is little evidence that membership in the
GATT/WTO has actually liberalized trade policy”. Hence, the lack of a significant and ro-
bust trade effect demonstrated in Rose (2004a) may simply reflect the lack of a liberalizing
trade policy effect of the WTO. But this explanation is not entirely convincing, since it is
obvious from the above characterization that WTO membership involves more than what is
observable in terms of its members’ trade policies. At any rate, such an explanation would
still leave us with a troubling verdict on the GATT/WTO, whose primary mandate is to
foster more liberal trade policies.
Several contributions have questioned that such a verdict is justified. For instance, Sub-
ramanian & Wei (2007) argue that there is a systematic pattern of asymmetry in this nexus
of WTO membership and trade policies. They conduct a Rose-type empirical analysis, but
looking at unidirectional trade (imports) rather than total trade flows between any two coun-
try pairs. More importantly, they allow for WTO membership to play a different role for
developing and industrial countries. They find a strong positive trade volume effect for the
latter, but not for the former. For instance, their preferred specification implies that WTO
membership has on average increased industrial countries’ bilateral imports by as much as 175
percent, while the estimated coefficients imply a much lower effect for developing countries.
In their view, this reflects a policy asymmetry in that developing countries did not utilize
their WTO membership toward trade liberalization, while developed countries typically did.
This asymmetry, in turn, is due to differentiated treatment of these two groups of countries
by the GATT/WTO; see above. This view receives empirical support in that Subramanian
& Wei (2007) also find larger membership effects after the change to a more demanding
stance vis a vis new members that took place in 1995. They also disaggregate along the
sectoral dimension, to find positive membership effects for trade in liberalized manufacturing
(for all countries) and for trade in non-liberalized manufacturing (for developed countries).
Unsurprisingly, no positive effect was found for textiles, footwear and food. What are we to
conclude from this exercise of disaggregation? While the results are certainly revealing, in
our view they can hardly be interpreted as unequivocal support of a trade increasing effect
of WTO membership. Rather, they provide a gravity-based documentation of the partial
failure/success of the GATT/WTO. Allowing all data to speak up in a unified way, Rose’s
(2004a) finding that there is no robust positive WTO membership effect on trade remains
upheld, even after Subramanian & Wei (2007); see also Rose (2006).6
6Some studies have taken the concern about excessive country pooling to the extreme by looking at in-
dividual countries. Thus, Lissovolik & Lissovolik (2006) have found Russian trade with WTO members to
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But a negative verdict on the GATT/WTO is still unjustified according to a further
criticism raised by Tomz et al. (2007). Rose’s results might partly be due to the fact that
WTO-type MFN treatment was sometimes also granted to non-members. In a similar vein,
the attempt to secure WTO accession might have triggered more liberal trade policies ahead
of formal membership. In Rose’s empirical strategy, either of these two cases militate against a
significant trade effect of WTO membership, provided that MFN treatment and pre-accession
liberalization did in fact lead to more trade. Tomz et al. (2007) therefore suggest a broader
view of WTO membership which includes de facto participation without formal member-
ship. They point out that the WTO explicitly provides for such participation by member
countries’ colonies, as well through provisional membership status during a country’s acces-
sion negotiation. Redoing Rose’s analysis with extended WTO coding of the data (including
non-membership participation), they find positive trade effects that are significant, both sta-
tistically and economically. For instance, the difference between bilateral trade volumes of
non-member participants of the WTO and non-participants is 140 percent. These “revision-
ist” results make the GATT/WTO appear in a more favorable light than was the case in
Rose (2004a), as well as Subramanian & Wei (2007). However, Rose (2007) points out that
closer inspection reveals certain puzzles that continue to cast doubt on a trade-promoting
effect of WTO membership. For instance, it seems difficult to imagine why non-membership
participation in the WTO should have a larger effect than membership, and the bilateral
trade effects found by Tomz et al. do not appear to show up in aggregate trade.
In statistical terms, the point raised by Tomz et al. (2007) is that Rose’s (2004a) analysis
involves a measurement error in WTO membership, leading to a downward bias in coef-
ficient estimates, while Subramanian & Wei (2007) point to country heterogeneity among
WTO members, measuring heterogeneity through the state of development. But there is
additional unobserved country heterogeneity, also among non-members, which may give rise
to biased coefficient estimates. Baier & Bergstrand (2007) have thoroughly addressed this
issue with respect to free trade agreements (FTAs), or more generally preferential trading
agreements (PTAs). In terms of our analysis, their argument is that there may be unobserved
country characteristics that influence trade, which may at the same time be systematically
correlated with WTO membership. Conventional estimation of the WTO membership effect
would then suffer from an omitted variables bias. Baier & Bergstrand (2007) suggest using
dyadic fixed effects in a panel data set to avoid a bias from such endogeneity. In addition
to controlling for endogeneity, this would also control for the time-invariant component of
be less than would be expected given its “gravity position”. The explanation offered by the authors can be
interpreted as evidence in the spirit of Subramanian & Wei (2007). Evenett & Gage (2005) have found mixed
effects for WTO accession of Angola, Bulgaria, Ecuador and Jordan.
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unobserved multilateral trade resistance.7 Their empirical study demonstrates that in much
of the earlier literature endogeneity has indeed caused a downward bias in the estimated
coefficients for the trade effects of PTAs. In principle, the same could hold true also for the
estimated WTO membership effects, although they do not address this in their paper. It is
interesting to note that Rose (2004a) did run estimations with country fixed effects, which
have consistently generated larger membership effects than those without. However, he still
regards these coefficients as small, relative to other effects; see Rose (2006).8
Generally, however, true endogeneity seems a less severe problem with WTO membership
as such than with PTAs. An upward bias would arise, for instance, if there is some unobserved
dyad-specific variable which is both, positively correlated with WTO membership (possibly
even in a causal way) and bilateral trade. Baier & Bergstrand (2007) list several examples
in this vein for PTAs. Basically, the endogeneity concern arises if certain country pairs are
more natural trading partners than others, and are therefore more likely to reach a regional
trading arrangement (in addition to trading more), for reasons other than those observed
“on the right-hand-side”. But this argument seems less convincing for the WTO which is a
multilateral, not a regional, trading arrangement. Jointly entering a multilateral agreement
like the GATT/WTO seems a somewhat odd response to being natural bilateral trading
partners. In a similar vein, the notion that certain countries are more natural trading partners
than others for the “whole world” (instead of bilaterally) seems far-fetched. However, even
absent endogeneity of WTO membership, heterogeneity along the lines of “natural trading
partners” or preferential trading arrangements might still involve de facto correlations, such
that ignoring PTAs as an explanatory variable for bilateral trade will lead to an omitted
variables bias. A priori, an upward bias seems more likely than a downward bias. The initial
studies by Rose (2004a,2005) did include PTA-regressors, but still failed to deliver a robust
WTO membership effect on trade.
From a broader perspective, the WTO status is but one element of the trading arrange-
ment that governs bilateral trade. Adding PTAs and the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), one obtains a rich pattern of possible arrangements. Some authors have argued in
favor of a mutually exclusive coding of trading arrangements. This means classifying trading
arrangements in such a way that any country pair belongs to one and only one arrange-
7The notion of multilateral trade resistance was introduced into the gravity approach by Anderson & van
Wincoop (2003). Their estimation involves nonlinear constraints. Importer- and exporter-country fixed effects,
are an easier way to control for multilateral resistance. Subramanian & Wei (2007) do this as well.
8Rose (2006) also emphasizes the difference in interpretation between fixed effects (“within”) estimation
of WTO-coefficients and estimates that also use cross section evidence. “Within” estimation asks whether
accession increases trade for a given country pair, while cross-section estimates compares across different
country pairs.
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ment. Bilateral trading arrangements relying only GATT/WTO membership would then
be identified in isolation, and the corresponding coefficient could be interpreted as a “pure”
WTO effect. Alternatively, PTA and WTO membership could be coded independently, as
in the original studies by Rose (2004a,2005). As Subramanian & Wei (2007) have pointed
out, if cumulative arrangement effects (e.g. from WTO membership plus PTAs) are additive,
then independent and mutually exclusive coding should deliver the same effects. However,
additivity might be questioned. For instance, one may argue that membership effects are hi-
erarchical. For instance, Subramanian & Wei argue that a PTA dominates all WTO effects,
meaning that WTO membership does not further increase bilateral trade if two countries
already belong to a PTA. If this is the case, then identification of the true WTO effect re-
quires hierarchical coding, whereby WTO membership is coded only for country pairs that
do not also belong to the same PTA (and similarly for importer GSP-status). If the trading
arrangements in fact work in a hierarchic manner, then independent coding would lead to an
underestimation of the pure WTO effect. It would seem that a truly general estimation of
arrangement effects requires mutually exclusive coding. Having estimates based on such data
at hand, one can then use an additivity (or some other) assumption to calculate composite
effects.
Eicher & Henn (2008) do this for the hierarchy assumption employed by Subramanian &
Wei (2007), similarly distinguishing between industrial and developing country PTA effects.
They corroborate the finding that the WTO works for industrial countries, but not for devel-
oping countries. Their composition exercise adds a further insight: Industrial countries find
almost no additional PTA effect, while developing countries see an average PTA effect equal
to 214 percent, which is even more than the WTO effect for developing countries. Eicher &
Henn (2008) also distinguish between different types of PTAs, and they add bilateral fixed
effects. This gives full control over all unobserved country-pair heterogeneity, in addition to
controlling for the time-invariant component of multilateral resistance. Estimation of WTO
and PTA effects is then based entirely on within-variation (time dimension). Their main
message is that almost all significant WTO affects found by Subramanian & Wei (2007) and
Tomz et al. (2007) vanish. This is a severe blow to the “revisionist” conclusions suggested by
recent literature. Importantly for our purpose, however, Eicher & Henn (2008) restrict their
data to positive trade pairs. The extensive margin of trade thus remains unexplored in their
analysis.9
9It is worth pointing out here that “revisionist” conclusions have also been drawn based on non-parametric
methods. Thus, Chang & Lee (2007) use non-parametric matching techniques to check for a trade effect of
“WTO treatment”, coming up with large positive effects of WTO membership on trade. Ambiguity still seems
to prevail.
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This leads to what thus seems to be the ultimate line of defense for the WTO, which
is at the core of this paper. Rose (2004a) and most of the subsequent literature estimate
the gravity equation on data that exclude country pairs where bilateral trade is zero. As
pointed out in the introduction, this is a potentially severe restriction. Intuitively, WTO
membership may play a role, not only for how much two countries trade with each other, but
also for whether they trade with each other at all. Technically, estimating a gravity equation
on non-zero observations alone suffers from an omitted variable bias. Unfortunately, the
standard theoretical underpinning of the gravity equation used in this type of literature does
not allow for zero trade. Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) suggest an ad-hoc modification of the
gravity model where zero trade emerges as a “corner-solution” in the sense of Wooldridge
(2002). Estimating this model using Tobit techniques they have generally found the omitted
variables bias to be empirically important.10 They also find that including the extensive
margin does make a difference for the estimated trade effect of WTO membership, generating
more evidence for a positive trade effect from membership. Helpman et al. (2008) use a
framework with heterogeneous firms to model the extensive margin, and they run a Heckman-
type procedure for empirical estimation. Although they look at the WTO issue only in a
peripheral way, they do find a significant effect of joint WTO membership in their Heckman
selection equation. According to their estimate, the likelihood of positive trade increases by
15 percentage points if two countries belong to the WTO. Liu (2007) runs panel regressions,
also including zero trade country pairs in his sample when looking at WTO membership
effects. He finds strong WTO effects at the extensive margin of world trade.
This paper is thus not the first to explore WTO membership effects at the extensive margin
of world trade. However, discussing the research that has followed his seminal contribution,
Rose (2006, p. 18) concludes “I’m now persuaded that membership in the GATT/WTO
encourages the creation of trading links where none might otherwise exist. How important
this is to world trade and welfare is currently unclear to me; I look forward to more work in
the area.” Our paper identifies and tries to fill several gaps that still exist in the literature.
Besides providing a concise yet thorough survey of the existing empirical literature, we
offer the following three main contributions. First, we go back to theory in developing the
simplest possible gravity model of bilateral trade that allows for zero trade as an equilibrium
outcome. Although we call our model a “corner solutions” version of the gravity model, it
goes well beyond Felbermayr & Kohler (2006), while at the same time being much simpler
10The empirical implementation of this approach in Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) has revealed that the in-
creasing force of distance as a trade barrier, transpiring from recent gravity estimates of the distance coefficient
(“distance puzzle”), can partly be explained as reflecting an omitted variables bias from ignoring the extensive
margin.
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than Helpman et al. (2008).11 More specifically, we generalize the Anderson & van Wincoop
(2003) model in the simplest possible way, in order to have the extensive margin of trade
explicitly show up in the familiar multilateral resistance terms. Second, our theoretical model
can be consistently estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood procedure with
exporter and importer fixed effects, as suggested by Santos & Tenreyro (2006). We work
with averaged cross-sections, since within and between variation on the extensive margin is
extremely noisy in the data. We compare results that are obtained with and without inclusion
of zero trade flows into the sample in order to gauge the quantitative importance of those
zero-trade observations. Third, we build on the Subramanian & Wei (2007) and Eicher &
Henn (2008), as well as Tomz et al. (2007) and check whether their empirical strategies make
a difference for the importance of the extensive margin. 12
3 A simple model of the extensive margin
Empirical analysis of WTO membership at the extensive margin of world trade requires a
suitable theoretical framework of world trade. We follow the literature in using the gravity
model. However, we modify this model to incorporate the possibility of zero bilateral trade.
The gravity equation for bilateral trade arises whenever demand satisfies the Inada conditions,
and if in equilibrium any one good is produced in only one country. In a world of comparative
advantage, this condition is met if equilibrium happens to involve complete specialization,
as noted by Deardorff (1998). The preferred justification in the literature, however, relies
on the monopolistic competition model of trade, enriched by features of geography, where
complete specialization is a necessary outcome due to product differentiation. The most
complete derivation of the gravity equation along these lines is Anderson & van Wincoop
(2003). Importantly, this derivation features trade barriers only of the iceberg cost type,
whence all goods are sold everywhere, albeit for different c.i.f. prices. It also features Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences which satisfy the Inada conditions, hence there is positive trade between
any pair of countries. In other words, there is no extensive margin of world trade.
11More details on the meaning of “corner solutions” will follow in section three.
12The paper most closely related to ours is Liu (2007) who similarly uses Poisson regressions to address the
extensive margin. However, there are several key differences. First, our analysis is based on an explicit model
of the extensive margin. Second, we use directed trade as the dependent variable, thus avoiding the silver
medal mistake pointed out by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), and we deliberately abstain from panel estimation.
Third, we duly take into account third country effects through multilateral resistance. And fourth, we explore
the above mentioned distinctions emphasized by Subramanian & Wei (2007) and Tomz et al. (2007). Since
we do not exploit the time dimension of the data, our results are probably best viewed as complementary to
those of Liu.
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Empirically, there are a lot of country pairs where bilateral trade is zero.13 Acknowledging
the lack of an extensive margin in the underlying theory, existing literature mostly estimates
the gravity equation on data that is restricted to country pairs with positive trade. This risks
misspecification of the regression and ignores potentially important information. Exploiting
this information requires a model allowing for zero trade. Felbermayr & Kohler (2006)
suggest a simple ad-hoc modification of the gravity approach where zero trade cases arise
as “corner-solutions”, and which may be estimated using Tobit techniques. The modification
rests on a threshold level of bilateral trade that needs to be reached for governments to
incur the investment cost for public infrastructure as required to support trade. Helpman
et al. (2008) develop a model of monopolistic competition with private fixed cost of serving
foreign markets. Their model combines such cost with firm heterogeneity in marginal cost, to
generate two extensive margins of trade. There is an extensive country margin separating zero
trade country pairs from trading pairs.14 In addition, for each country pair the model also
generates an extensive firm margin that separates firms exporting to the partner country
from those who don’t. The model is in the spirit of Melitz (2003), although it is partial
equilibrium in that it does not incorporate a resource constraint, with an exogenous mass of
firms. There is multiple selection of existing firms into potential export markets. The model
is geared toward estimation of a generalized gravity approach including the two extensive
margins, using a two-step estimation procedure a la Heckman (1979).
For the purpose of this paper and for many other applications, a much simpler model
without firm heterogeneity suffices to motivate the empirical strategy. On the demand side,
we assume Dixit-Stiglitz-type preferences, identical for all countries, with a constant elasticity
of substitution σ > 1 between different varieties of goods. Preferences are fully symmetric
across all potential varieties, independent on the country of origin. Using pij to denote the
c.i.f.-price in country j for a variety arriving from country i, demand for this variety may
be written as Dji = Aj
(
pij
)−σ
, where Aj := Y j
(
P j
)σ−1
. In this expression, Y j is equal to
country j’s GDP, and P j is the exact price index (unit-expenditure function), depending on
13As indicated above, Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) present a decomposition of the postwar evolution of
world trade into the extensive and the intensive margin.
14An extensive country margin of world trade also arises in Eaton & Kortum (2002) who employ a stochas-
tic representation of the pattern of (Ricardian) comparative advantage among many countries with perfect
competition. Adding geography in the form of trading cost, they arrive at a gravity-type equation for bilateral
trade. The key difference to the standard gravity model is that for any good all countries are perfect sub-
stitutes as sources of supply. In their model, two countries end up with zero bilateral trade, if for the entire
range of goods each of them finds cheaper supply from third countries, due to their idiosyncratic technology
and geography.
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prices of all varieties shipped to market j.15
There are C + 1 countries, and we use i to indicate a country of production. Each firm
produces its own variety, using a well defined efficiency unit of a bundle of inputs, with
associated minimum unit-cost ci, which is specific to the country where a firm is located.
Variation in ci will be explained below by varying factor endowments and/or varying overall
productivity across countries. Unlike Helpman et al. (2008), we assume that all firms have
the same productivity in terms of both marginal and fixed cost. We use a to denote the
constant marginal input requirement, while f denotes the fixed cost of production, all in
terms of efficiency units of the input bundle.
Serving a foreign market entails two types of cost. One is variable trade costs, assumed
to be of the iceberg-type and captured by a parameter τ ij > 1, where i and j indicate the
sending and receiving country, respectively. In addition, there is a fixed cost f ij that each
firm located in country i has to bear when entering an export market j.16 Fixed costs are in
terms of the input bundle with minimum unit cost ci. Domestic sales do not require any of
these costs, whence τ ii = 1 and f ii = 0. Variable and fixed trade cost are defined to include
both, natural as well as policy-induced factors of trade resistance.
Profit maximization by a representative firm located in country i, assuming any P j to be
given, implies a markup price equal to
pij = τ ijcia/ρ, (1)
where ρ := (σ−1)/σ from the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The price for domestic sales is equal
to ci/ρ. A typical firm locating in country i will perceive maximum profits to be earned on
exports to country j equal to
piij = (1− ρ)ρσ−1Aj(ciaτ ij)1−σ − cif ij . (2)
Obviously, the firm will choose to export to country j only if piij ≥ 0. This condition may be
rewritten as
(1− ρ)ρσ−1(cia)1−σ ≥ f ij(τ ij)σ−1/Aj . (3)
We can now envisage all potential trading partners of country i as being ranked, such that
f ij(τ ij)σ−1/Aj falls monotonically, as j 6= i increases from 1 up to C. Note that this ranking
is specific to the exporting country i. Then, there will be a marginal country ji, such that
for all countries j ≤ ji condition (3) is satisfied, while for all countries j > ji it is violated.
15GDP replaces the level of expenditure, assuming balanced trade.
16The model bears some resemblance to Schmidt & Yu (2001) who introduce firm heterogeneity in fixed
costs of exporting into a single export market.
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This is the extensive country margin of exports for country i, determined independently for
each export market. We introduce an integer-valued function
ji = ji(ci, τ i, f i) (4)
to indicate that country i’s extensive margin of trading partners ji depends on its entire
pattern of iceberg- and fixed trade resistance, which appear in vector forms τ i and f i in
equation (4). We use J i to denote the index set of all j ≤ ji. Thus, country i will have
positive exports only to countries j ∈ J i. Notice that even if trade costs are symmetric in
both directions, trade flows may be unidirectional, since ci is country specific, and the trade
resistance terms need not be symmetric in terms of direction. It should be noticed that the
key “relative price” determining profitability of bilateral exports is (ciτ ija)/P j , in addition
to the size of the market relative to fixed cost, Y j/f ij .
We now introduce a latent variable ρσ−1Aj(ciτ ij)1−σ, which is the potential value of
exports to country j per firm located in country i. The actual per firm value of exports from
i to j then is
pijxij =
{
ρσ−1(ciaτ ij)1−σAj , if i ∈ J i
0 otherwise
(5)
This is the “corner-solutions” formulation of bilateral exports, where cif ij/(1−ρ) is a thresh-
old value for the latent variable ρσ−1(ciaτ ij)1−σAj that determines zero “corner-solutions” of
bilateral exports to all countries j > ji (or, equivalently, j /∈ J i). Aggregate bilateral exports
are Xij = N ipijxij , evaluated at c.i.f. prices.17
We now introduce two aggregate measures of the export markets served by a firm located
in country i:
Θi :=
1
Ai
∑
j∈Ji A
j(τ ij)1−σ and zi :=
∑
j∈Ji f
ij . (6)
The variable Θi the “aggregate size” of foreign markets reached by a representative firm of
country i, relative to country i’s domestic market, using Aj to measure market size, and
scaling down market size by the iceberg trade cost term (τ ij)1−σ. It is closely related to what
is sometimes called the nominal export market potential of country i. More precisely, Θi is
the ratio of c.i.f. export sales to domestic sales by a representative firm located in country i.
In what follows domestic sales are indicated by pi0xi0. The variable zi is a simple measure
of the entire fixed costs of exporting incurred by each firm in country i, again measured in
17In this paper, we use the term “corner solutions” model for any model that involves zero trade as an
equilibrium outcome of the same mechanisms that also determine the volume of trade. Any such model
involves a non-linear relationship between trade (allowing for zeros) and the covariates. Wooldridge (2002)
uses the term “corner solutions” to describe Tobit estimation techniques to incorporate the nonlinearity. In
out empirical analysis, we rely on a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator; see below.
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efficiency units of the input bundle with a per unit cost equal to ci. Both of these measures
are determined by the extensive country margin of exports which is determined as described
above. For given trade costs, both Θi and zi are increasing in ji(τ i, f i).
It is important to make a distinction between the impact of infra-marginal trade liber-
alization which operates through τ ij and f ij for j ∈ J i with a given ji, and the impact of
trade liberalization at the margin, which increases ji through either a reduction in τ ij or f ij
for some j > ji. However, we first continue describing the equilibrium for a given ji.
Profits on actual exports from i to j ≤ ji are equal to [(ciaτ ij/ρ) − ciaτ ij ]xij − cif ij .
Moreover, denoting domestic sales by a representative country-i-firm by xi0, market clearing,
Dji = xij , requires xij = (Aj/Ai)(τ ij)−σxi0 and pijxij = (Aj/Ai)(τ ij)1−σpi0xi0, since pij =
τ ijpi0. Assuming free entry, we may then invoke a zero profit condition of the form
xi0a
1− ρ
ρ
(
1 + Θi
)− (zi + f) = 0. (7)
This determines the level of domestic sales per firm in a familiar way, except for the appear-
ance of two measures of the extensive country margin of exports, zi and Θi. Total output
and sales per firm are determined solely by market potential and fixed costs, xi0 = (σ −
1)
(
zi + f
)
/
[
a
(
1 + Θi
)]
. Note also that we have the GNP-identity N ixi0cia
(
1 + Θi
)
/ρ ≡
Y, hence
pi0xi0 =
Y i
N i (1 + Θi) .
(8)
We now close the model by introducing endowments and factor market clearing. Using
the scalar V i to denote country i’s endowment with the input bundle (in efficiency units), the
equilibrium number of firms emerges from the full employment condition which is written as
N i
[
aXi0(1 + Θi) + f +zi
]
= V i. In view of (7), this simplifies to
N i =
V i
(zi + f)σ
. (9)
Thus, the equilibrium number of firms is unaffected by Θi, but it falls with an increase in
zi + f , relative to the resource base V i. On the other hand, the equilibrium volume of
domestic sales per firm is independent on the resource base V i. These are familiar properties
of the Dixit-Stiglitz version of the monopolistic competition model.
Finally, factor prices are determined such that the cost-minimizing input levels per effi-
ciency unit of the input bundle add up to the country’s endowment for each of the factors
present. More specifically, assume that c(w) is a dual characterization of the technology, com-
mon to all countries, according to which K different factors may be combined to generate an
efficiency unit of the input bundle required in the variable and fixed cost of production and
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trade, with w denoting the vector of factor prices.18 Then, eick(wi) gives the cost-minimizing
physical quantity of factor k used to generate an efficiency unit of the input bundle according
to country i’s (Ricardian) level of technology, captured by the efficiency parameter ei. Factor
market equilibrium in country i then requires
eick(w) = V ik/V
i k = 1 . . .K (10)
for all k = 1 . . .K, where V ik denotes the physical endowment of country i with factor k. The
factor cost advantage of country i introduced above then emerges as ci = eic(wi), where wi
is the factor price vector satisfying the aforementioned factor market equilibrium condition.
We are now ready to derive a gravity equation for bilateral trade. Aggregate bilateral
exports Xij from i to j are given by N ipijxij = N i(Aj/Ai)(τ ij)1−σpi0xi0. Replacing for pi0xi0
from (8), we have
Xij =
 Y
iY j (τ
ij/P j)1−σ∑ji(ci,τ i,fi)
j=0 A
j(τ ij)1−σ
if j ∈ J i
0 otherwise
(11)
Note that the denominator in the first line is equal to 1 + Θi. Remembering that Aj :=
Y j(P j)σ−1, this leads to a generalized Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) representation of the
gravity approach.19 The key difference to note here is that the denominator in the first line
involves the extensive country margin ji(ci, τ i, f i). The full Anderson & van Wincoop system
emerges, if we recognize that the importing country’s true price index P j in the numerator
of (11) has c.i.f. prices pij related to the respective home prices pi0, now holding j fixed
and varying the country of origin i. This leads to a second type of extensive margin where
exporting countries select themselves into exporters and non-exporters for any importing
country j. We may indicate this margin through an index set Ij whereby i ∈ Ij iff j ∈ J i.
We do not want to impose a symmetry assumption that would allow us to derive the full
Anderson & van Wincoop system. The general idea of our approach is easy enough to see
from (11) above. The essential points are as follows. First, the “gravity term” on the right-
hand side of (11) is a latent variable which is strictly positive for all country pairs. However,
firms in country i expect negative profits to be earned on exports to any country j /∈ J i, due
to fixed costs f ij , and observed exports Xij will, therefore, be zero. These are the “corner-
solutions”. Note that by assumption firm decisions are made taking all aggregate variables,
i.e., all price indices and multilateral resistance terms (involving extensive country margins
18The model actually does not depend on the assumption of a uniform technology; we could allow for
country-specific minimum cost function ci(w).
19See also Appendix II in Helpman et al. (2008).
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ji), as given. The number of firms in each exporting country is endogenously determined
through (9).
The second point to observe relates to the WTO membership effect on trade. There is a
direct trade promoting effect at the intensive margin through a lower τ ij , if countries i and
j ∈ J i are both members of the WTO. According to (11), these countries should have more
bilateral trade than country pairs that are otherwise similar, but where both are outside the
WTO or only one is a member. There is a perfectly analogous effect at the extensive margin,
making positive trade for member country pair a more likely event than for a non-member
pair. This may operate through lower τ ij or lower f ij in the denominator of (11). Notice that
f ij plays no role for the intensive margin effects of WTO membership, but may be important
for extensive margin effects.
In addition, there are indirect (“third-country”) effects that operate through the multi-
lateral resistance channel. Suppose, for instance, that two countries i and j ∈ J i are both
members of the WTO, and there is a third country k /∈ J i with no exports from i to k. Now
suppose that k joins the WTO and through lower τ ik and or lower f ik it jumps the extensive
export margin of country i, i.e., k moves into J i in the upper limit of the summation in (11).
Bilateral trade resistance between i and j, relative to these two countries’ multilateral resis-
tance has increased, assuming that τ ij as such remains unchanged. As a result, exports from
i to j fall through an extensive margin effect of country k’s WTO accession. The same effect
will not be observed for non-member country pairs, but will be observed also if j is not in the
WTO. Any study that looks only at the intensive margin and ignores the extensive margin
multilateral resistance effect will thus underestimate the trade effect of WTO membership.20
Intuitively, what we have here is something like a trade diversion effect that comes about
through the resource constraint of the exporting country. Newly established trade between i
and k draws away resources from exports to existing trading partners.
4 An empirical model
Our ultimate goal is to empirically quantify the effect of WTO membership. Our emphasis lies
on an appropriate treatment of the extensive margin of trade, based on our corner solutions
model of the gravity model developed above. While that model does highlight the possibility
of zero trade between certain country pairs, it does not yet offer a workable estimation
equation. A key feature of the “corner-solutions” gravity equation is that it is non-linear.
20We have seen in the preceding section that allowing for multilateral resistance through fixed effects has
indeed tended to increase the estimated membership effect.
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A possible estimation approach to such an equation is to rely on Tobit techniques, as in
Felbermayr & Kohler (2006). This paper uses a different approach, recently suggested by
Santos & Tenreyro (2006), that has a number of advantages over the Tobit approach.
According to this approach, the empirical model based on equation (11) is as follows.
Recognizing that Xij can be zero, we follow Santos and Tenreyro (2006) and write equation
(11) as an exponential model
Xij = exp
[
(1− σ) ln τ ij +Ki +Kj] , (12)
where Ki := lnY i − ln
[∑ji(ci,τ i,f i)
j=0 A
j(τ ij)1−σ
]
and Kj := ln
[
Y j
(
P j
)σ−1]. Note that i and
j denotes the exporter and importer country, respectively. The estimation strategy proposed
by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) or Feenstra (2004) amounts to using an array of exporter-
and importer-specific dummy variables to control for Ki and Kj . This approach perfectly
controls for the multilateral resistance term, which would otherwise have to be simulated
and which cannot be directly measured in the data. Failing to control for the multilateral-
resistance term is likely to cause severely biased estimates, as Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) have shown. It should also be noticed that the use of dummy variables does away
with the awkward question of proper discounting of trade and GDP values; see Baldwin &
Taglioni (2006). It allows estimation including observations of country pairs where GDP
data is not available (or unreliable) for either the importer or the exporter. Importantly, the
country-dummies are perfect controls for country-specific policies that apply to all trading
partners, regardless of WTO membership. Many non-tariff and technical barriers to trade
have this characteristic.
Typically, researchers add a multiplicative error term εij to (12), take logs and substitute
dummy variable vectors νi and νj for Ki and Kj , respectively. This yields the familiar log-
log gravity equation lnXij = α ln τ ij + βjνj + βiνi + ln εij , where α := 1− σ is interpreted
as the trade-cost elasticity of bilateral exports and βi and βj are vectors of parameters
associated with the exporter and importer country dummies introduced to control for Ki
and Kj , respectively. In a typical empirical gravity equation (e.g., Anderson & van Wincoop,
2003), real trade costs τ ij are specified as some multiplicative function of policy-induced trade
barriers and a host of geographic variables τ ji =
(
1 + tij
) · (DISTij)δ · exp [(1−CATji)γ],
where (1−CATji) is a row vector of ones minus relevant categorical variables (with associated
coefficients in γ) affecting real trade costs τ ij , in addition to distance DISTij and ad valorem
tariffs tij . Notice that, as usual, coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities.
The problem with this procedure, as pointed out by Silva & Tenreyro (2006), is that unless
the variance of εij is independent on the variables Zij :=
{
τ ij ,νi,νj
}
, the expectation of
ln εij will depend on these same regressors, leading to inconsistent OLS estimates. Moreover,
taking logs generates “missing values” if for some country pairs bilateral trade is zero, as
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in the “corners solutions” above. This, in turn, may bias estimates, since the data may no
longer be viewed as randomly sampled.21
Santos & Tenreyro (2006) suggest an approach that avoids these problems. Given that the
log of a stochastic variable also depends on its variance, the estimation should be guided by
the assumed relationship between E
[
Xji|Zij] and V [Xji|Zij], where Zij denotes the entire
vector of explanatory variables. For want of a more specific information on this relationship
a reasonable hypothesis might be that conditional variance of M ji is proportional to its
conditional mean, i.e. E
[
Xji|Zij] ∝ V [Xji|Zij]. Santos and Tenreyro show that (12) can
then be estimated by solving the following set of first order conditions∑C(C−1)
r=1
[
M r − exp
(
Zrβˆ
)]
zrh = 0 h = 1 . . . H (13)
where r indexes bilateral import relationships (ji). In this estimation criterion, Zr denotes
an H × 1-dimensional vector of covariate observations (with element zrh), and βˆ denotes
the corresponding vector of of parameter estimates. This estimator is equivalent to the
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. It is consistent under the correct
specification of the conditional mean. Importantly, the data need not be Poisson22, and Xr
need not be integer-valued. Santos & Tenreyro (2006) implement this estimator for a cross-
sectional gravity equation. They compare what they call “a traditional gravity equation” that
does not properly account for multilateral resistance with an “Anderson- van Wincoop gravity
equation”, using country-specific dummy variables. They find that the inclusion of those
dummies affects results quite substantially, in particular concerning categorical variables,
such as WTO membership.
The key contributions to the literature on the trade effects of GATT/WTO member-
ship mostly use OLS on pooled cross-sections. However, as emphasized above, the “corner-
solutions” gravity model that allows for zero trade pairs is necessarily non-linear. Hence, the
PPML approach suggested by Santos & Tenreyro (2006) is a much better way to estimate
this model. The concerns raised in the recent literature surveyed in section 3 above can also
be addressed using this approach. Indeed, this is the key contribution of the present paper.
21Tobit and Heckman-type procedures can deal with the corner-solutions nature of equation (11); they are,
however, not robust to misspecification of the error term.
22A maximum-likelihood estimator is called a pseudo maximum-likelihood estimator if it remains consistent
even if the likelihood function is misspecified (Winkelmann, 2003).
18
5 Data and econometric strategy
Before turning to our estimation results, we briefly describe the estimation strategy that we
believe is appropriate for our data set. We start with a brief description of the data.
Trade: Our trade data is from the May 2006 CD-ROM of the IMF’s Direction of Trade
Statistics (DoTS). Some of the literature (e.g., Rose, 2004) estimates the gravity equation
on gross trade (exports plus imports). In line with theory, our model has bilateral exports
as the dependent variable. However, we estimate the gravity equation on bilateral import
data, measured in c.i.f. terms, as this data is usually deemed of higher quality. With the
number of countries equal to C = 181 for the year 2000, we thus have C (C − 1) = 32, 580
bilateral trade relationships. Trade values are missing for 20.7 percent of these country pairs.
The IMF codes 63.5 percent of the non-missing observations as zeros. Figure 1 provides
an illustration of missing, zero, and positive trading relationships for the years 1948-2004.
The data exhibit considerable discrete jumps in the share of missing observations, due to
decolonialization or due to the break-up of countries, such as the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
However, as a general trend, the share of active trading relationships has increased strongly
over time, both measured in terms of total potential relationships and non-missing ones.
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Figure 1: The relative importance of the extensive margin, 1948-2004.
One must be cautious, however, in interpreting variations at the extensive margin of trade
cross time. For example, many country pairs exhibit frequent switches between active trade,
zero trade, and missing. For example, between 1948 and 2004 we observe as many as 26
such switches for the Malta-Paraguay country pair; similarly for Sri Lanka-Tunesia. For 5
19
percent of all country pairs, switches occur more than 12 times. These frequent switchers
are usually small, poor countries. Exploring the likelihood of switches across time, we find
that a Probit model explaining zero trade does equally well in predicting the occurrence
of missings. Hence, it seems unwise to focus too much on time-variance, at least in an
analysis that explicitly focuses on the role of the extensive margin.23 In our econometric
analysis, we therefore take averages over certain time spans. More specifically, we define
the following sub-periods characterized by certain stages of the GATT: Pre-Kennedy-round
(1948-1967), pre-Tokyo-round (1968-1979), pre-Uruguay-round (1980-1994) and, finally, the
(post-Uruguay) WTO-period (1995-2004). The first period covers a sequence of tariff-cutting
rounds. The second period is characterized by a broadening of the scope of the GATT to
include anti-dumping measures. The third period additionally involves rules on non-tariff
measures and the so-called framework agreements. And the fourth period is marked by the
transition from the GATT to the WTO.
Within these time intervals, missing bilateral imports are interpreted as zeros whenever at
least one year features a non-missing observation. This procedure should reduce measurement
error since it smoothens out idiosyncratic switches between zero, positive trade, and missings,
although the strategy does reduce the amount of zero-trade observations, relative to a year-
by-year treatment of the data. Hence, a corner solution of zero trade is defined as a case
where, subject to the above treatment of missings, we observe zero trade for each year of
the time respective time period. The summary statistics presented in Table 1 show that the
share of active trading relationships has grown from about 48 percent in the pre-Kennedy
period to 87 percent in the post-Uruguay times.
GATT/WTO membership: Tomz et al. (2007) emphasize the distinction between formal
membership at the GATT or the WTO/WO, and informal participation in the institution,
for example of colonies through their metropolitan colonizers, or through de facto compli-
ance during negotiation ahead of formal membership. They find factual membership (i.e.,
compliance with GATT rules through either formal or informal participation) is significantly
related to higher trade, while participation defined as formal membership does not.24 In the
subsequent econometric analysis, we want to see whether this distinction continues to matter
when the analysis covers the extensive margin of trade and a theory-consistent estimation
23Indeed, comparing the raw data from COMTRADE with the DoTS reveals that the latter often has zeros
and missings where the COMTRADE has small values (e.g., 1,000,000 dollar).
24Throughout this paper factual membership means compliance with GATT rules either through formal
membership or de facto (informal) compliance as defined in Tomz et al. (2007).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
I(M>0) indicator variable 0.48 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.79 0.40 0.87 0.34
ln Imports 13.20 2.77 13.30 3.80 13.49 4.12 13.79 4.27
Imports (USD mn) 7.75 92.60 45.30 497.00 123.00 1540.00 254.00 3200.00
WTO (formal) 0.14 0.26 0.35 0.47 0.39 0.45 0.38 0.29
WTO (formal) x IND 0.05 0.18 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.21
WTO (formal) x DEV 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.30 0.30
WTO (factual) 0.41 0.43 0.58 0.48 0.57 0.47 0.41 0.28
WTO (factual) x DEV 0.12 0.29 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.21
WTO (factual) x IND 0.29 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.32 0.30
Regional trade agreement (dummy) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.05
GSP 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.29 0.17 0.37 0.08 0.19
ln Distance 8.72 0.77 8.72 0.77 8.69 0.79 8.69 0.79
Contiguity (dummy) 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Common language (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35
Every colony (dummy) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12
Common colonizer (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31
Currently colony (dummy) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
Same country (dummy) 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Strict currency union (dummy) 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03
Summary Statistics
Pre-Kennedy Kennedy-Tokyo Tokyo-Uruguay Post-Uruguay
N=13,155 N=14,364 N=20,388 N=22,516
approach is chosen.25
Figure 2 shows that the share of countries with formal membership in the GATT/WTO
increases through time; it was less than 20 percent in 1948, rising to about 73 percent in the
year 2001 when no more than 11 countries are classified as informal members.26 Somewhat
surprisingly, however, from the era of decolonialization (mid sixties) onwards, the share of
countries factually participating in the GATT/WTO, has remained fairly stable. A similar
picture emerges from the summary statistics in Table 1.
Other covariates: Our control variables are identical to those typically used in the lit-
erature; the data are from Rose (2004a). It includes dummies for joint membership in a
regional trade agreement or a strict currency union and a dummy for whether the importer
grants GSP (generalized system of preferences) status to the exporter. These variables may
vary over time and represent trade policy controls. The model also includes geographical
or cultural variables, such as geographical distance, contiguity, the existence of a common
language, and a host of dummies reflecting the colonial relationship between an importer
and the exporter. Rose’s (2004a) estimation relies on data that covers the period 1948-1999.
25We use the classification of countries by formal and informal membership status, respectively, as provided
on the website of Michael Tomz.
26The year 2001 is the latest period covered in the classification supplied by Tomz.
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Figure 2: Formal / informal GATT/WTO members and outsiders, 1948-2004
We have updated our data to the year 2004 using information about WTO membership and
regional trade agreements provided on the website of the WTO.
Econometric strategy: Our strategy differs from existing literature in several respects.
First, unlike Rose (2004a), Tomz et al. (2007), Subramanian & Wei (2007) and Eicher &
Henn (2008), we place emphasis in the extensive margin of trade. In a recent paper that
looks at the extensive margin, Liu (2007) employs a panel framework, controlling for time-
invariant bilateral effects (e.g., unobserved bilateral components of trade policy). He thus
draws exclusively on within-variance (switches from outsider into member status over time).
We have argued above that a close inspection of the data leads us to question the reliability of
time series variation at the extensive margin of trade. We therefore propose an econometric
strategy that relies on cross section variation rather than a panel framework. In that sense,
our results are best viewed as complementary to Liu’s. Our strategy has the further advantage
that it allows us to trace the behavior of the WTO effect over time. It also avoids having to
deal with the fact that over time new countries have been created through decolonialization
and the break-up of the Soviet Union.27
We proceed in two steps. First, we look at the extensive margin in isolation, employing
a cross-section Probit estimation framework for the aforementioned sub-periods represent-
ing characteristic episodes in the history of the GATT/WTO. In doing so, we also explore
the differential role of formal vs. informal membership, as well as the difference between de-
27In Felbermayr & Kohler (2006), this is called the “pseudo-extensive” margin.
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veloping and industrial countries. The second step then estimates the full corner-solutions
gravity model, relying on Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) procedure, in order
to capture the non-linearity implied by corner solutions; see above. We avoid what Bald-
win & Taglioni (2006) call the “gold medal mistake” by consistently using importer- and
exporter fixed effects to control for unobserved variables.28 Moreover, our specification is
theory-grounded in the sense that we use bilateral imports, rather than total trade (exports
plus imports) as our dependent variable. This also increases the number of observations for
each period; see Table 1 for details.29
6 Estimation results
6.1 A Probit view on the extensive margin
In this section we look at role of WTO membership at the extensive margin of world trade
independently of the intensive margin. We represent Probit regression results of a cross-
section analysis in 4 different periods of GATT/WTO history. The dependent variable is an
indicator variable Iij that takes the value 1 if country i has strictly positive imports from
country j, i.e., if Xij > 0, and the value of zero otherwise. We present results from the
Probit model, but logistic and the linear probability model give comparable results. All our
regressions include country-effects, but they are not shown to save space. We decompose the
effect of WTO membership according to whether the importer country is a developing or an
industrial country. Using the country classification of Subramanian & Wei (2007), we define
a dummy INDi, such that INDi = 1 if country i is industrialized and INDi = 0 otherwise.
We compute the interactions WTOij×INDi and WTOij× (1− INDi) and jointly use them
in our regressions, where WTOij = 1 indicates that countries i and j are both members of
the WTO. For the sake of comparison, the variables included in the regression are the same as
those by Tomz et al. (2007) and Subramanian & Wei (2007). Whenever a variable perfectly
predicts an outcome, it is dropped. Moreover, observations are dropped also for countries
which import from all other countries.
Table 2 reports the results, with different time periods lined up as different columns. All
coefficients come with the expected signs whenever they are statistically significant. Com-
paring across time periods, we may note that distance becomes ever less important as a
28Liu (2007) tries to solve this problem by proxying unobserved variables.
29Rose (2004a) and Tomz et al. (2007) use total trade. Subramanian & Wei (2007) also use imports.
However, although they use the same sources for their trade data include only 6,638 country pairs with
strictly positive imports (for 2000).
23
Table 2: WTO membership and the extensive margin of trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Membership status: formal factual formal factual formal factual formal factual
Dependent variable: I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0) I(Mij>0)
WTO x IND 0.462*** 0.00356 0.127*** 0.0712*** 0.00848 0.0580** 0.0440 0.0700
(0.105) (0.0524) (0.0213) (0.0254) (0.0398) (0.0292) (0.0424) (0.0438)
WTO x DEV 0.0192 -0.0212 0.0403*** 0.0177 0.0131 0.0395*** 0.0311** 0.0199
(0.0475) (0.0350) (0.0138) (0.0178) (0.0108) (0.0122) (0.0155) (0.0173)
RTA 0.504* 0.537* 0.480** 0.478**
(0.302) (0.318) (0.214) (0.213)
GSP 1.707 1.772 0.234*** 0.263*** 0.250*** 0.241*** -0.0757 -0.0786
(1.227) (1.239) (0.0309) (0.0301) (0.0599) (0.0595) (0.0810) (0.0790)
Currency union 0.680*** 0.674*** 0.365*** 0.367*** 0.0999 0.101 0.495*** 0.496***
(0.169) (0.168) (0.0832) (0.0845) (0.0617) (0.0617) (0.186) (0.187)
ln Distance -0.389*** -0.391*** -0.171*** -0.176*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.0759*** -0.0760***
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.00698) (0.00714) (0.00589) (0.00604) (0.00400) (0.00402)
Contiguity 0.122* 0.125* -0.0159 -0.0197 -0.0163 -0.0196 -0.0317 -0.0314
(0.0633) (0.0641) (0.0459) (0.0475) (0.0380) (0.0386) (0.0353) (0.0352)
Common language 0.0563** 0.0586*** 0.0273*** 0.0300*** 0.0459*** 0.0450*** 0.0285*** 0.0284***
(0.0220) (0.0221) (0.00936) (0.00952) (0.00680) (0.00683) (0.00475) (0.00475)
Every colony 0.372*** 0.378*** 0.0805*** 0.0812*** 0.0279 0.0225
(0.0455) (0.0479) (0.0201) (0.0209) (0.0646) (0.0671)
Common colonizer 0.312*** 0.318*** 0.0896*** 0.0921*** 0.0601*** 0.0587*** 0.0217*** 0.0215***
(0.0185) (0.0193) (0.00686) (0.00706) (0.00610) (0.00621) (0.00501) (0.00502)
Same country -0.0635 -0.0686 0.00992 0.00853 0.0773*** 0.0788*** 0.0458*** 0.0460***
(0.0947) (0.0939) (0.0462) (0.0478) (0.0173) (0.0164) (0.0119) (0.0117)
N 12147 12147 14131 14131 16453 16453 15212 15212
r2_p 0.560 0.559 0.491 0.490 0.423 0.423 0.440 0.440
obs. P 0.698 0.698 0.745 0.745 0.805 0.805
pred. P 0.879 0.875 0.903 0.903 0.944 0.944
chi2 3699 3700 4008 4000 4170 4155 3697 3687
Chi2 ( IND = DEV ) 17.75*** 0.22 17.1*** 5.806** 0.01 0.44 0.1 1.44
Table 1. Extensive Margin - Probit Models
All coefficients are to be read as marginal effects (evaluated at sample averages). Robust standard errors in parentheses (corrected for clustering at country-
pair level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include importer and exporter effects and a constant (not shown). Pre-Kennedy refers to averages for 
period 1948-1967; Kennedy.Tokyo to 1968-1978; Tokyo-Uruquay to 1979-1994; Post Uruguay to 1995-2004. Number of observation reflects observations that 
are not perfectly predicted by covariates. Chi2 (IND=DEV) tests equality of coefficients  WTO x IND and WTO x DEV.
Kennedy-Tokyo Post UruguayPre Kennedy Tokyo-Uruquay
determinant of the extensive margin of world trade. This may reflect the fact that countries’
trading relationships are becoming more and more far-reaching geographically. This is an in-
teresting result that has not been noted before. It contrasts with the “distance-puzzle” found
in intensive-margin-models surveyed in Disdier & Head (2008), by which distance plays an
increasingly important role in restricting trade.30 Also, the trade-creating effect of colonial
variables is weakening over time.
Industrial versus developing importers. Odd-numbered columns report the marginal
effect on bilateral trade of the importer and the exporter both being formal members of the
WTO. In the pre-Kennedy-round period, formal membership has had a fairly strong positive
30On the extensive margin, see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006).
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impact on the likelihood of an industrialized importer having an active trade relationship
with other WTO members. Membership raises those odds by about 46 percentage points.
This is a large effect compared to other determinants of the probability of positive trade,
such as the existence of a common language, which increases this likelihood by a mere 6
percent. On the other hand, granting easier market access to industrial countries through
the generalized system of preferences (GSP) does not affect the likelihood of trade. The same
is true if the importer WTO member is a developing country.
In the aftermath of the Kennedy-round, developing importers also see some effect of
GATT membership (formal or informal) on the extensive margin, but the impact is much
smaller than for industrialized countries (equality of coefficients is rejected at the 1 percent
level). However, in the period between the conclusion of the Tokyo and the Uruguay rounds
positive effects appear restricted to non-formal membership. Formal membership alone has
no significant effect either for industrial or developing countries. After 1995, the extensive
margin effect of formal membership seems to have become operative again for developing
countries, although its quantitative importance is rather subdued. Overall, Table 2 tells that
to some extent the conclusions drawn by Subramanian & Wei (2007) for the intensive margin
carry over to the extensive margin. However, there is a reversal over time: Subsequent to the
Uruguay-round, developing countries tend to benefit more than industrial countries.
Formal versus factual membership. Even-numbered columns in Table 2 define WTO
membership on factual rather than formal grounds. Our results suggest that in the pre-
Kennedy-round era, where the number of informal members was almost as large as the
number of formal members, factual membership did not enhance the likelihood of trade. The
same holds true in the interval between the Kennedy- and the Tokyo-round, where factual
membership does not add anything to the likelihood of an active trading relationship. Things
are different, however, for the third time phase between the Tokyo- and the Uruguay-round,
where factual membership turns out to increase the odds of trade, while formal membership
does not. Finally, in recent years, with informal members massively converting into formal
ones, factual membership does not appear to affect the likelihood of trade, while formal
membership does. Hence, we do not find that a focus on factual (as opposed to formal) mem-
bership makes the advantage of being associated to the GATT/WTO any more visible in an
econometric analysis of the extensive margin. This is an important piece of new information
relative to Tomz et al. (2007) who find this type of effect to obtain at the intensive margin.
Our results are quite plausible: What would be the benefits of formal membership beyond
informal one when the latter were at least as effective in activating trade relationships?
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Figure 3: The extensive margin year-by-year (dashed lines indicate 5% confidence bands).
Robustness checks. Figure 1 plots WTO coefficients obtained by running regressions
of the type discussed in Table 3 as yearly cross-sections rather than taking averages over
the different phases of the GATT/WTO history. This procedure drastically increases the
number of zeros in the data, but presumably comes at the cost of substantial measurement
error.31 The top row of panels depicts the effects of formal membership, while the bottom row
depicts those of factual membership. Treating industrialized and developing countries alike,
formal membership appears as a more robust positive influence on the probability of trade
than factual membership. Both yield large positive results for some years after 1991. This
may reflect the increased number of potential trading relationships as new countries have
emerged due to the break-up of the URSS. Turning to developing countries, in earlier times
formal WTO membership was worth much less for developing countries than for industrialized
ones. However, this pattern has recently reversed. Moreover, we do not find any evidence
that factual membership is more robustly associated with increased trading probabilities. If
anything, the opposite holds true. Thus, year-by-year regressions tend to confirm the findings
presented in Table 3.
We should, however, bear in mind that the amount of trade creation at the extensive
margin is over the entire evolution of world trade after formation of the GATT has been
relatively small; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) and Helpman et al. (2008). To eliminate
the “pseudo-extensive margin” due to formation of new countries, Felbermayr & Kohler
(2006) use a sample of countries that have been in existence ever since 1965. They find that
31To limit measurement problems, we focus on the post-1970 era, where idiosyncratic switches between
zeros, positive trade values, and missings are far less frequent than in the years before.
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15 percent of total world trade in 2004 is due to bilateral relationships that have not existed
in 1965. Hence, while WTO membership may indeed increase the odds that two members
engage in trade, the contribution of the extensive margin on total world trade growth cannot
be possibly very large. In the next section we therefore study the intensive margin of world
trade, but allowing for trade to be zero, as in the corner solutions version of the gravity model
presented in section 3 above. Using a PPML estimation approach allows us to see to what
extent the extensive margin changes the total pro-trade effect of WTO membership.
6.2 Estimating the full non-linear model
We have argued in section 4 that the potential of zero trade as an equilibrium outcome gives
rise to a non-linear gravity model of bilateral trade. Following Santos & Tenreyro (2006), we
now proceed to estimating this model using a Poisson pseudo maximum-likelihood (PPML)
procedure.
Average effects: OLS versus PPML: Table 3 sets estimates from the standard log-log
OLS procedure against Poisson pseudo maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimates. Columns
labeled (A) present conventional results where the dependent variable is the log of bilateral
imports, lnMij . Columns labeled (B) use PPML on the same sample as in (A), while columns
(C) extend the sample to zero-trade observations, which drop out in the OLS approach as
the log of zero is not defined.
The OLS results look familiar. The elasticity of distance is fairly large and doubles in
absolute terms over time. Cultural proximity (colonial ties, common language) boost trade
considerably. Formal GATT/WTO membership increases bilateral trade in all time-spans
considered, except for the time between the Kennedy- and the Tokyo-round of the GATT.
Running PPML on the same sample (i.e., excluding zero-trade observations), the distance
coefficient is much smaller, the dummy for colonial ties is less frequently significant, and the
regional trade agreement dummy comes with comparable size. As to WTO/GATT member-
ship, the results are somewhat bleaker than those from OLS estimation. Indeed, during the
first two time-spans considered, GATT membership seems associated with lower bilateral
trade. This effect is quantitatively substantial and roughly constant over the two periods.
In the Tokyo- to Uruguay-round era, WTO membership simply does not seem to matter.
It is only in post-Uruguay-round times that abiding by rules of the WTO appears to boost
bilateral trade. The effect is statistically significant and economically important. On average,
the volume of trade is twice as large for WTO members than for outsiders.
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Table 3: Trade creation and the extensive margin: OLS versus PPML
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Dep.var. ln Mij Mij>0 Mij ln Mij Mij>0 Mij ln Mij Mij>0 Mij ln Mij Mij>0 Mij
OLS PPML PPML OLS PPML PPML OLS PPML PPML OLS PPML PPML
WTO 0.235** -0.690*** -0.735*** -0.193** -0.853*** -0.886*** 0.200** -0.126 -0.177 0.836*** 1.118*** 1.113***
(0.101) (0.167) (0.159) (0.0966) (0.183) (0.179) (0.0909) (0.209) (0.210) (0.188) (0.303) (0.302)
RTA -1.759** 0.0631 0.0118 0.982** 0.248 0.239 0.914*** 0.146 0.143 0.389 0.562*** 0.555***
(0.883) (0.349) (0.350) (0.426) (0.161) (0.161) (0.224) (0.123) (0.123) (0.295) (0.159) (0.159)
GSP 3.242*** -8.859*** -8.341*** 1.678*** 0.345*** 0.383*** 1.335*** 0.247*** 0.260*** 1.305*** 0.378*** 0.396***
(1.163) (2.645) (2.637) (0.0736) (0.0777) (0.0781) (0.0460) (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0793) (0.0995) (0.100)
Currency union 1.387*** 1.896*** 1.979*** 1.327*** 0.812*** 0.861*** 1.215*** -0.469 -0.452 2.720*** -1.860** -1.857**
(0.272) (0.282) (0.282) (0.267) (0.200) (0.200) (0.328) (0.353) (0.357) (0.595) (0.771) (0.779)
ln Distance -0.886*** -0.594*** -0.593*** -1.375*** -0.708*** -0.716*** -1.566*** -0.693*** -0.694*** -1.598*** -0.681*** -0.681***
(0.0322) (0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0322) (0.0360) (0.0364) (0.0268) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0247) (0.0288) (0.0289)
Contiguity 0.296** 0.314*** 0.306*** 0.328** 0.247** 0.230** 0.506*** 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.434*** 0.422*** 0.425***
(0.128) (0.117) (0.118) (0.140) (0.101) (0.101) (0.112) (0.0853) (0.0856) (0.120) (0.0825) (0.0833)
Common language 0.472*** 0.537*** 0.579*** 0.501*** 0.424*** 0.441*** 0.493*** 0.435*** 0.443*** 0.562*** 0.285*** 0.290***
(0.0667) (0.0961) (0.0968) (0.0677) (0.0838) (0.0846) (0.0589) (0.0819) (0.0818) (0.0541) (0.0776) (0.0777)
Ever colony 1.415*** 0.802*** 0.796*** 1.514*** 0.405*** 0.414*** 1.213*** 0.133 0.132 1.072*** 0.0812 0.0783
(0.119) (0.140) (0.142) (0.113) (0.105) (0.107) (0.103) (0.0985) (0.0988) (0.107) (0.102) (0.103)
Common colonizer 0.848*** 0.0234 -0.0443 0.812*** -0.0886 -0.0715 0.965*** 0.153 0.141 0.874*** -0.0232 -0.0194
(0.0957) (0.191) (0.185) (0.0943) (0.148) (0.149) (0.0771) (0.174) (0.173) (0.0695) (0.197) (0.197)
Same country 0.691*** -0.607** -0.555** 1.032*** 0.528*** 0.414** 0.669*** 0.519** 0.543** 0.545*** 0.445*** 0.451***
(0.206) (0.261) (0.268) (0.208) (0.152) (0.204) (0.159) (0.251) (0.252) (0.164) (0.142) (0.141)
Current colony -0.668 1.896*** 1.979*** 0.228 1.229*** 1.346*** -0.160 1.900*** 1.904*** -0.212 1.774** 1.793**
(0.914) (0.282) (0.282) (0.774) (0.326) (0.347) (1.057) (0.501) (0.503) (1.309) (0.701) (0.706)
Observations 6301 6301 13155 10101 10101 14364 16186 16186 20388 19542 19542 22516
R-squared 0.735 0.751 0.762 0.779 . .
F / chi2 85.09 29114 29114 150.1 97361 99282 198.9 61488 63775 249.1 73775 90285
Table 2. Intensive Margin: OLS versus PPML (formal membership)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (corrected for clustering at country-pair level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include importer and exporter effects and a constant (not shown). 
Pre-Kennedy refers to averages for period 1948-1967; Kennedy.Tokyo to 1968-1978; Tokyo-Uruquay to 1979-1994; Post Uruguay to 1995-2004. Number of observation reflects observations that are 
not perfectly predicted by covariates.
Post UruguayPre Kennedy Kennedy-Tokyo Tokyo-Uruguay
The role of the extensive margin: Columns labeled (C) include zero-trade observations,
thus allowing for WTO membership to enhance the likelihood of a trading relationship to
exist at all, in addition to increasing the magnitude of trade. Including zero trade country
pairs more than doubles the number of observations in earlier years. In more recent periods,
due to the fact that increased utilization of potential trade relationships has reduced the
number of zeros, the number of observations still increases by 15 percent.32 The OLS results
in columns (A) suffer from two problems. First, the log-log model is consistent only under
very strong assumptions on the specification of the error term. And secondly, the results may
be biased as the extensive margin is ignored. Columns (B) remedy the first problem, columns
(C) help with both issues. Since (B) and (C) look fairly similar, it is save to conclude that the
extensive margin per se does not play an important role in explaining the difference between
OLS and PPML. For the post-Uruguay period, WTO membership increases bilateral trade
by about 205 (i.e., e1.118 − 1) percent, whether zeros are included or not. Note that this
magnitude is comparable to the findings in Subramanian & Wei (2007). As in their analysis,
the comprehensive inclusion of country-specific fixed effects guarantees that multilateral trade
resistance (e.g., relative to all countries in the world) is duly taken into account. Given the
32Without taking averages, the prevalence of zeros would be much stronger.
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fact that most countries today are WTO members, it is tempting to interpret our WTO
coefficient as the cost of non-membership.
Our results are in contrast to the panel estimates reported by Liu (2007), which seem to
suggest that including zeros increases the trade-creating potential of WTO membership by
about 30 percent. The difference is potentially due to three features of our approach. First,
we include importer- and exporter-country fixed effects, in order to control for multilateral
trade resistance as a determinant of bilateral trade. This turns out to be crucial for the results
obtained. Secondly, for reasons outlined above we average the data over several years prior
to estimation, while Liu uses yearly observations. To see what this implies, figure 4 reports
results from yearly regressions and compares estimates on the a sample restricted to non-
zero trade with those from unrestricted samples for the years 1970 to 2001. It turns out that
averaging as such is not responsible for the weak WTO effect at the extensive margin, at least
not in cross-sections. This leaves Liu’s reliance on variance across time (within-variance) in
a panel estimation framework as a second explanatory factor for a seemingly robust positive
role of WTO membership for the extensive margin of trade. However, as pointed out above,
a close inspection of our data leads us to question the reliability of time-series evidence on
the occurrence of zero trade.33
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Figure 4: Restricted (solid lines) versus full (dashed lines) samples.
Industrial versus developing importers: Finally, Table 4 distinguishes between indus-
trialized and developing WTO members, as well as between formal and factual participation
33His finding is hard to square with the low quantitative importance of new trade relationships in the 2004
total trade volume, see Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) and Helpman et al. (2008).
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in the GATT/WTO. The sign of our coefficient estimates is consistently negative for the first
three time spans considered and turn positive only in the post-Uruguay-round era. Concen-
trating on formal membership, we find that developing importers were not “penalized” by
GATT membership in the pre-Kennedy-round era, while industrial importers were. In the
Tokyo- to Uruguay-round period, this pattern reverses, while both types of countries seem
to lose in the Kennedy- to Tokyo-round period. Turning to the period after the Uruguay
agreement, we find strongly positive effects comparable in size to some of the estimates of
Subramanian & Wei (2007). However, it turns out that developing countries benefit more
strongly from WTO membership than industrialized countries. The difference in the coef-
ficients is statistically significant and amounts to a differential trade creation of about 100
percent (e1.343 − e1.035).
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Figure 5: Industrialized (solid lines) versus developing (dashed lines) importers.
Overall, as with the Probit estimates on the extensive margin, there is no evidence that
factual membership is more robustly associated with higher trade than formal one. In a
similar vein, the comparison between industrial and developing countries does not depend
on the definition of membership. Our results thus question the revisionist view proposed by
Tomz et al. (2007).
Figure 5 provides a robustness check to the above findings, depicting the WTO coefficients
from yearly regressions, where WTO membership is defined on formal grounds. It turns out
that the coefficients for industrial and developing countries do not differ too much, except
for the intermediary period, where industrialized countries have higher coefficients.
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Table 4: Trade creation and the extensive margin: industrialized versus developing countries;
formal versus factual membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Membership status: formal factual formal factual formal factual formal factual
Dependent variable: Mij Mij Mij Mij Mij Mij Mij Mij
WTO x IND -1.060*** -0.974*** -0.906*** -1.034*** -0.0442 0.275 1.035*** 1.017***
(0.169) (0.189) (0.182) (0.193) (0.215) (0.220) (0.335) (0.340)
WTO x DEV -0.0515 -0.0144 -0.832*** -1.127*** -0.539** -0.185 1.343*** 1.285***
(0.201) (0.212) (0.232) (0.235) (0.231) (0.242) (0.329) (0.337)
RTA 0.00992 -0.0167 0.237 0.249 0.136 0.135 0.560*** 0.561***
(0.361) (0.358) (0.162) (0.161) (0.123) (0.122) (0.159) (0.159)
GSP -9.534*** -8.576*** 0.368*** 0.442*** 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.362*** 0.365***
(2.718) (2.649) (0.0795) (0.0775) (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.116) (0.116)
Currency union 1.875*** 1.976*** 0.854*** 0.892*** -0.371 -0.380 -1.904** -1.907**
(0.282) (0.283) (0.200) (0.198) (0.349) (0.335) (0.777) (0.774)
ln Distance -0.622*** -0.609*** -0.716*** -0.713*** -0.694*** -0.693*** -0.682*** -0.681***
(0.0471) (0.0461) (0.0364) (0.0363) (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0288) (0.0288)
Contiguity 0.314*** 0.313*** 0.232** 0.229** 0.407*** 0.400*** 0.425*** 0.427***
(0.119) (0.117) (0.101) (0.100) (0.0851) (0.0841) (0.0833) (0.0834)
Common language 0.545*** 0.572*** 0.439*** 0.424*** 0.442*** 0.432*** 0.292*** 0.292***
(0.0963) (0.0958) (0.0848) (0.0842) (0.0820) (0.0809) (0.0764) (0.0765)
Every colony 0.861*** 0.843*** 0.415*** 0.418*** 0.135 0.131 0.0773 0.0780
(0.136) (0.139) (0.107) (0.109) (0.0989) (0.0990) (0.102) (0.102)
Common colonizer 0.0452 -0.195 -0.0768 -0.00900 0.211 0.263 -0.0521 -0.0471
(0.186) (0.190) (0.149) (0.148) (0.170) (0.175) (0.198) (0.198)
Current colony 0.703* 1.311*** 1.338*** 1.396*** 1.952*** 1.978*** 1.780** 1.715**
(0.381) (0.398) (0.347) (0.351) (0.488) (0.502) (0.706) (0.686)
Same country -0.648** -0.455* 0.406** 0.434** 0.578** 0.568** 0.442*** 0.443***
(0.272) (0.259) (0.206) (0.201) (0.247) (0.248) (0.141) (0.141)
N 13155 13155 14364 14364 20388 20388 22516 22516
chi2 29114 29114 99396 99630 63529 64661 84388 85479
P-value IND = DEV
Table 3. Intensive Margin - PPML Models
Robust standard errors in parentheses (corrected for clustering at country-pair level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include importer and 
exporter effects and a constant (not shown). Pre-Kennedy refers to averages for period 1948-1967; Kennedy.Tokyo to 1968-1978; Tokyo-Uruquay to 1979-1994; 
Post Uruguay to 1995-2004. Number of observation reflects observations that are not perfectly predicted by covariates.
Pre Kennedy Kennedy-Tokyo Tokyo-Uruquay Post Uruguay
7 Conclusion
World trade has evolved over the past five decades at both, the intensive and extensive margin.
Existing studies exploring the role of GATT/WTO membership for trade have mostly been
restricted to the intensive margin, ignoring country pairs with zero bilateral trade. The
results are mixed, but trade-promoting influence of GATT/WTO membership remains in
doubt. However, consistent estimation of the trade-promoting influence of GATT/WTO
membership requires an empirical framework that allows for variation at the extensive margin
that separates positive- from zero-trade country pairs. In this paper, we have developed
what is probably the simplest possible gravity model that serves this purpose. We have
estimated this model on a conventional data set of bilateral trade and the usual gravity
controls, including in particular a set of dummy variables for trading arrangements, such as
WTO membership.
31
Our estimation strategy duly responds to the issues raised in recent literature. Thus, we
account for multilateral resistance, and we differentiate between country-groups (developing
and industrial countries), as well as between formal membership as opposed to factual partic-
ipation in the GATT/WTO. Moreover, responding to concerns about the reliability of trade
data at the extensive margin, we abstain from panel estimation and rely on cross sectional
evidence instead, averaging our data for the important phases of GATT/WTO history.
What is the conclusion that we may draw from our empirical exercise? First, we do
find some evidence for WTO membership to raise the odds that countries trade with each
other at all, but the effect is by no means robust across country groups and time. Nor
does a broader definition of membership that includes de facto participation make much of
a difference. The asymmetry, both across country groups and types of membership, changes
erratically over sub-periods considered. A significantly positive Probit coefficient estimate
emerges in less than half the number of specifications considered. The positive findings of
WTO membership reported in Subramanian & Wei (2007) and Tomz et al. (2007) for the
intensive margin thus do not carry over in any robust way to our Probit view on the extensive
margin of world trade.
Things do not improve in any reassuring way, if we turn to a non-linear Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimation of the non-linear model which looks at the intensive
margin, but allows for zero-trade country pairs. Indeed, running PPML estimates on the
entire sample of countries gives rise to an even bleaker picture for formal WTO membership
than do conventional OLS estimates relying on positive trade only. It is only for the aftermath
of the Uruguay-round that we obtain a significantly positive effect for formal membership.
Grossly speaking, the same result obtains if we differentiate between types of membership
and country groups.
The broad conclusion, then, is that the extensive margin does not prove a powerful line of
defense for WTO membership as a trade-promoting force in a model which otherwise seems
to work fine in terms of explanatory power, as well as the magnitude and significance of
coefficient estimates.
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